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dc.contributor.authorNygard Bergh, Haralden
dc.contributor.authorKind, Hans Jarleen
dc.contributor.authorReme, Bjørn-Atleen
dc.contributor.authorSørgard, Larsen
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-06-
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-20T10:36:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-20T10:36:58Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/61007-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze strategic interactions between two competing distributors of an independent TV channel. Consistent with most of the relevant markets, we assume that the distributors set end-user prices while the TV channel sets advertising prices. Within this framework we show that the distributors have incentives to internalize the fact that viewers dislike ads on TV, but no incentives to internalize how the TV-channel's profits from the advertising market are affected by end-user prices. This leads to some surprising results. First, we show that even undifferentiated distributors might make positive profits. Second, a TV channel might find it optimal to commit to not raising advertising revenue. Third, regulation of the advertising volume might be welfare improving even if the unregulated advertising level is too low from a social point of view.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aCenter for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo) |cMunichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCESifo Working Paper |x3885en
dc.subject.jelL10en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided marketen
dc.subject.keywordcoordinationen
dc.subject.keywordregulationen
dc.subject.keywordTV industryen
dc.subject.stwFernsehsenderen
dc.subject.stwWettbewerben
dc.subject.stwFernsehwerbungen
dc.subject.stwRundfunkfinanzierungen
dc.subject.stwRegulierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleCompetition between content distributors in two-sided markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn720711231en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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