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dc.contributor.authorMartin, Antoineen
dc.contributor.authorOrlando, Michaelen
dc.contributor.authorSkeie, Daviden
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:26:48Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:26:48Z-
dc.date.issued2006-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60632-
dc.description.abstractIn a simple search model of money, we study a special kind of memory that gives rise to an arrangement resembling a payment network. Specifically, we assume that agents can pay a cost to access a central database that tracks payments made and received. Incentives must be provided to agents to access the central database and to produce when they participate in this arrangement. We also study policies that can loosen these incentive constraints. In particular, we show that a “no-surcharge” rule has good incentive properties. Finally, we compare our model with that of Cavalcanti and Wallace.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report |x263en
dc.subject.jelE59en
dc.subject.jelG29en
dc.subject.jelL14en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpayment networks, money, searchen
dc.subject.stwZahlungsverkehren
dc.subject.stwSuchtheorieen
dc.subject.stwAllokationseffizienzen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titlePayment networks in a search model of money-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn522100422en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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