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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Staff Report No. 199
Verlag: 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, New York, NY
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper explores the effects of central bank transparency on the performance of optimal inflation targeting rules. I assume that both the central bank and the private sector face uncertainty about the correct model of the economy and have to learn. A transparent central bank can reduce one source of uncertainty for private agents by communicating its policy rule to the public. The paper shows that central bank transparency plays a crucial role in stabilizing the agents' learning process and expectations. By contrast, lack of transparency can lead to expectations-driven fluctuations that have destabilizing effects on the economy, even when the central bank has adopted optimal policies
JEL: 
E52
E31
E63
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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