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dc.contributor.authorMartin, Antoineen
dc.contributor.authorMcAndrews, Jamesen
dc.date.accessioned2012-08-17T14:24:03Z-
dc.date.available2012-08-17T14:24:03Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/60524-
dc.description.abstractWe study the incentives of participants in a real-time gross settlement system with and without the addition of a liquidity-saving mechanism (queue). Participants in our model face a liquidity shock and different costs for delaying payments. They trade off the cost of delaying a payment against the cost of borrowing liquidity from the central bank. The heterogeneity of participants in our model gives rise to a rich set of strategic interactions. The main contribution of our paper is to show that the design of a liquidity-saving mechanism has important implications for welfare, even in the absence of netting. In particular, we find that parameters will determine whether the addition of a liquiditysaving mechanism increases or decreases welfare.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of New York |cNew York, NYen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aStaff Report |x282en
dc.subject.jelE42en
dc.subject.jelE58en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordliquidity-saving mechanism, real-time gross settlement, large-value payment systemsen
dc.subject.stwZahlungsverkehren
dc.subject.stwVerrechnungsverkehren
dc.subject.stwBankenliquiditäten
dc.subject.stwGeldmarkten
dc.subject.stwLiquiditätseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleLiquidity-saving mechanisms-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn540108537en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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