Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/60469 
Year of Publication: 
2012
Series/Report no.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 63
Publisher: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Abstract: 
In this paper we investigate the existence of a two-tier medical system in the German acute care hospital sector using data from a survey of 483 German hospitals. The focus of our analysis lies on the impact of hospital concentration on the probability of discrimination of patients with different health insurances in regard to the access to medical services. Accounting for a possible endogeneity of market structure, we find that hospitals in highly concentrated markets are less likely to pursue any differentiation among prospective patients with different health insurances. We ascribe this finding to competitive pressure in less concentrated markets. Hospitals in competitive markets are more obliged to steal business from rival hospitals by privileging profitable patients than hospitals in highly concentrated markets.
Subjects: 
Hospital markets
Patients' discrimination
Survey data
JEL: 
I1
I11
L1
L19
L22
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-062-8
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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