Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/59685
Authors: 
Calzolariy, Giacomo
Pavan, Alessandro
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1498
Abstract: 
We illustrate, by means of two examples, why assuming the principals offer simple menus (i.e. collections of payoff-relevant alternatives) as opposed to more general mechanisms may preclude a complete characterization of the set of equilibrium outcomes in certain sequential contracting environments. We then discuss how refinements of the solution concept, or enrichments of the menus that allow for recommendations, may restore the possibility of using menus to obtain a complete equilibrium characterization.
Subjects: 
sequential contracting
mechanism design
menus theorems
JEL: 
D89
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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