Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/59671 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorGomes, Renatoen
dc.contributor.authorPavan, Alessandroen
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-25-
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-12T12:34:16Z-
dc.date.available2012-07-12T12:34:16Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59671-
dc.description.abstractWe study second-degree price discrimination in markets where the product traded by the monopolist is access to other agents. We derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the welfare and the profit-maximizing mechanisms to employ a single network or a menu of non-exclusive networks. We characterize the optimal matching schedules under a wide range of preferences, derive implications for prices, and deliver testable predictions relating the structure of the optimal pricing strategies to conditions on the distribution of match qualities. Our analysis sheds light on the distortions associated with the private provision of broadcasting, health insurance and job matching services.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aNorthwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science |cEvanston, ILen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aDiscussion Paper |x1540en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordmatchingen
dc.subject.keywordtwo-sided marketsen
dc.subject.keywordnetworksen
dc.subject.keywordadverse selectionen
dc.subject.keywordincentivesen
dc.subject.keywordmechanism designen
dc.titlePrice discrimination in many-to-many matching markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn670493457en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:nwu:cmsems:1540en

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
1.13 MB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.