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dc.contributor.authorBubb, Ryanen
dc.contributor.authorKaufman, Alexen
dc.date.accessioned2010-03-17-
dc.date.accessioned2012-06-20T16:10:01Z-
dc.date.available2012-06-20T16:10:01Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/59243-
dc.description.abstractCredit score cutoff rules result in very similar potential borrowers being treated differently by mortgage lenders. Recent research has used variation induced by these rules to investigate the connection between securitization and lender moral hazard in the recent financial crisis. However, the conclusions of such research depend crucially on understanding the origin of these cutoff rules. We offer an equilibrium model in which cutoff rules are a rational response of lenders to perapplicant fixed costs in screening. We then demonstrate that our theory fits the data better than the main alternative theory already in the literature, which supposes cutoff rules are exogenously used by securitizers. Furthermore, we use our theory to interpret the cutoff rule evidence and conclude that mortgage securitizers were in fact aware of and attempted to mitigate the moral hazard problem posed by securitization.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPublic Policy Discussion Papers |x09-5en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelG01en
dc.subject.jelG18en
dc.subject.jelG21en
dc.subject.jelG24en
dc.subject.jelG28en
dc.subject.jelN22en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwSecuritizationen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwSubprime-Hypotheken
dc.subject.stwKreditwürdigkeiten
dc.subject.stwFinanzmarktkriseen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleSecuritization and moral hazard: Evidence from a lender cutoff rule-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn621217352en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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