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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 09-10
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
We define generalized extensive-form games which allow for mutual unawareness of actions. We extend Pearce's (1984) notion of extensive-form (correlated) rationalizability to this setting, explore its properties and prove existence. We define also a new variant of this solution concept, prudent rationalizability, which refines the set of outcomes induced by extensive-form rationalizable strategies. Finally, we define the normal form of a generalized extensive-form game, and characterize in it extensive-form rationalizability by iterative conditional dominance.
Schlagwörter: 
unawareness
extensive-form games
extensive-form rationalizability
prudent rationalizability
iterative conditional dominance
JEL: 
C70
C72
D80
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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