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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Working Paper No. 11-6
Verlag: 
University of California, Department of Economics, Davis, CA
Zusammenfassung: 
Morris (1996, 1997) introduced preference-based definitions of knowledge of belief in standard state-space structures. This paper extends this preference-based approach to unawareness structures (Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper, 2006, 2008). By defining unawareness and knowledge in terms of preferences over acts in unawareness structures and showing their equivalence to the epistemic notions of unawareness and knowledge, we try to build a bridge between decision theory and epistemic logic. Unawareness of an event is behaviorally characterized as the event being null and its negation being null.
Schlagwörter: 
unawareness
awareness
knowledge
preferences
subjective expected
utility theory
decision theory
null event
JEL: 
C70
C72
D80
D82
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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