Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/57558 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Papers on Economics and Evolution No. 1022
Verlag: 
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
Behavioral (e.g. consumption) patterns of boundedly rational agents can lead these agents into learning dynamics that appear to be wasteful in terms of well-being or welfare. Within settings displaying preference endogeneity, it is however still unclear how to conceptualize well-being. This paper contributes to the discussion by suggesting a formal model of preference learning that can inform the construction of alternative notions of dynamic well-being. Based on the assumption that interacting agents are subject to two biases that make them systematically prefer some cultural variants over others, a procedural notion of well-being can be developed, based on the idea that policy should identify and confine conditions that generate dynamic instability in preference trajectories.
Schlagwörter: 
Social Learning
Preference Change
Welfare
Human Cognition
Consumer Behavior
JEL: 
D63
O12
D11
D83
C61
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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