Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/57503
Authors: 
Grechenig, Kristoffel
Kolmar, Martin
Year of Publication: 
2011
Series/Report no.: 
Preprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011,24
Abstract: 
The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are (partly) restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection. A ban of private enforcement measures can even be beneficial in situations where there would be no private enforcement at first place because the shadow of defense has a negative impact on the investments in property rights infringements. From a legal perspective, our approach emphasizes a regulation of victim behavior as opposed to the standard approach which focuses on the regulation of criminal behavior.
Subjects: 
Contests
Property Rights
Enforcement
Private Protection
Law
JEL: 
K42
P14
P37
P48
N40
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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