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dc.contributor.authorHerweg, Fabianen
dc.contributor.authorMüller, Danielen
dc.contributor.authorWeinschenk, Philippen
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-15-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-24T11:04:26Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-24T11:04:26Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57473-
dc.description.abstractWe modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully contingent contract. The logic is that, due to the stochastic reference point, increasing the number of different wages reduces the agent's expected utility without providing strong additional incentives. Moreover, for diminutive occurrence probabilities for all signals the agent is rewarded with the fixed bonus if his performance exceeds a certain threshold.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aMax Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |cBonnen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aPreprints of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods |x2010,38en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelM12en
dc.subject.jelM52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwVergütungssystemen
dc.subject.stwAsymmetrische Informationen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwRisikoaversionen
dc.subject.stwPrinzipal-Agent-Theorieen
dc.subject.stwVertragstheorieen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleBinary payment schemes: Moral hazard and loss aversion-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn636808076en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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