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dc.contributor.authorFünfgelt, Joachimen
dc.contributor.authorSchulze, Günther G.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-17T12:55:58Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-17T12:55:58Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/57166-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the formation of environmental policy to regulate transboundary pollution if governments are self-interested. In a common agency framework, we portray the environmental policy calculus of two political supportmaximizing governments that are in a situation of strategic interaction with respect to their environmental policies, but too small to affect world market prices. We show how governments systematically deviate from socially optimal environmental policies. Taxes may be too high if environmental interests and pollution-intensity of production are very strong; under different constellations they may be too low. Governments may actually subsidize the production of a polluting good. Politically motivated environmental policy thus may be more harmful to the environment as compared to the benevolent dictators' solution. In other cases it may enhance environmental quality and welfare beyond what a benevolent government would achieve.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aLeuphana Universität Lüneburg, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre |cLüneburgen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper Series in Economics |x196en
dc.subject.jelQ58en
dc.subject.jelF5en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpolitical economyen
dc.subject.keywordenvironmental policyen
dc.subject.keywordtransboundary pollutionen
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen
dc.subject.keywordstrategic interactionen
dc.subject.stwUmweltpolitiken
dc.subject.stwPublic Choiceen
dc.subject.stwGrenzüberschreitende Umweltbelastungen
dc.subject.stwZwei-Länder-Modellen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleEndogenous environmental policy when pollution is transboundary-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn654925712en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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