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dc.contributor.authorBerninghaus, Siegfried K.en
dc.contributor.authorTodorova, Loraen
dc.contributor.authorVogt, Bodoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-01-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-11T09:31:43Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-11T09:31:43Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56920-
dc.description.abstractThis paper presents results from an experiment designed to study the effect of self reporting risk preferences on strategy choices made in a subsequently played 2 X 2 coordination game. The main finding is that the act of answering a questionnaire about one's own risk preferences significantly alters strategic behavior. Within a best response correspondence framework, this result can be explained by a change in either risk preferences or beliefs. We find that self reporting risk preferences induces an increase in subjects' risk aversion while keeping their beliefs unchanged. Our findings raise some questions about the stability of strategy choices in coordination games.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFriedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |cJenaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aJena Economic Research Papers |x2011,057en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelC91en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcoordination gameen
dc.subject.keywordquestionnaireen
dc.subject.keywordrisk preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordbeliefsen
dc.subject.keywordbest response correspondenceen
dc.subject.stwExperimentelle Ökonomiken
dc.subject.stwBefragungen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwKoordinationen
dc.subject.stwRisikopräferenzen
dc.subject.stwSelbstevaluationen
dc.titleA simple questionnaire can change everything: Are strategy choices in coordination games stable?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn67595116Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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