EconStor >
Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik, Jena >
Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik >

Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:

http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56861
  
Title:Persuasive silence PDF Logo
Authors:Suzuki, Toru
Issue Date:2012
Series/Report no.:Jena economic research papers 2012,014
Abstract:In the market where inattentive buyers can fail to notice some feasible choices, the key role of marketing is to make buyers aware of products. However, the effective marketing strategy is often subtle since marketing tactics can make buyers cautious. This paper provides a framework to analyze an effective marketing strategy to persuade an inattentive buyer in an adverse selection environment. We investigate how an attention-grabbing marketing can 'backfire' and when it can be effective.
Subjects:signaling game
consideration set
counter signaling
limited attention
marketing
advertising
JEL:D03
D82
D83
L15
Document Type:Working Paper
Appears in Collections:Jena Economic Research Papers, MPI für Ökonomik

Files in This Item:
File Description SizeFormat
689680295.pdf462.62 kBAdobe PDF
No. of Downloads: Counter Stats
Download bibliographical data as: BibTeX
Share on:http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56861

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.