Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/56835
Authors: 
Thomes, Tim Paul
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Jena economic research papers 2010,056
Abstract: 
This paper presents a theory of vertically interrelated markets of identical fixed size under implementation of positive indirect network effects. By introducing two Salop circles, a two-sided market model is provided, where intermediaries of differentiated copyrights for intellectual property, like performing rights organizations or publishers, compete as oligopsonists for owners of the intellectual property and as oligopolists for the users of their blanket licenses. We demonstrate, that an increase in competition benefits either license users or copyright owners or harms both groups. Moreover, if license users gain from an increased market entry, the owners of the intellectual property have to incur losses and vice versa.
Subjects: 
vertical restraints
indirect network effects
copyright enforcement
performing rights organizations
music industry
JEL: 
D43
L13
L44
L82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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