Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56832 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2012,005
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.
Schlagwörter: 
bidding behavior
procedural fairness
voting paradox
JEL: 
C92
D02
D71
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
515.5 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.