Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56824 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Jena Economic Research Papers No. 2011,034
Verlag: 
Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena
Zusammenfassung: 
We compare, on the basis of a procedurally fair provision point mechanism, bids for a public project from which some gain and some lose with bids for a less efficient public project from which all gain. In the main treatment, participants independently decide which one, if any, of the public projects should be implemented. We also run control treatments where only one of the two projects can be implemented. We find that (a) mixed feelings per se do not affect bidding behavior, and (b) the provision frequency of the project that raises mixed feelings declines significantly when it faces competition from the public good.
Schlagwörter: 
public project
bidding behavior
procedural fairness
JEL: 
C72
C92
D63
H44
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
576.58 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.