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dc.contributor.authorAdam, Tim R.en
dc.contributor.authorFernando, Chitru S.en
dc.contributor.authorSalas, Jesus M.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-22-
dc.date.accessioned2012-04-05T16:15:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-04-05T16:15:39Z-
dc.date.issued2012-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56664-
dc.description.abstractSurveys of corporate risk management document that selective hedging, where managers incorporate their market views into firms' hedging programs, is widespread in the U.S. and other countries. Stulz (1996) argues that selective hedging could enhance the value of firms that possess an information advantage relative to the market and have the financial strength to withstand the additional risk from market timing. We study the practice of selective hedging in a 10-year sample of North American gold mining firms and find that selective hedging is most prevalent among firms that are least likely to meet these valuemaximizing criteria - (a) smaller firms, i.e., firms that are least likely to have private information about future gold prices; and (b) firms that are closest to financial distress. The latter finding provides support for the alternative possibility suggested by Stulz that selective hedging may also be driven by asset substitution motives. We detect weak relationships between selective hedging and some corporate governance measures, especially board size, but find no evidence of a link between selective hedging and managerial compensation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aHumboldt University of Berlin, Collaborative Research Center 649 - Economic Risk |cBerlinen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSFB 649 Discussion Paper |x2012-019en
dc.subject.jelG11en
dc.subject.jelG14en
dc.subject.jelG32en
dc.subject.jelG39en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordcorporate risk managementen
dc.subject.keywordselective hedgingen
dc.subject.keywordspeculationen
dc.subject.keywordfinancial distressen
dc.subject.keywordcorporate governanceen
dc.subject.keywordmanagerial compensationen
dc.subject.stwGoldbergbauen
dc.subject.stwRisikomanagementen
dc.subject.stwHedgingen
dc.subject.stwSpekulationen
dc.subject.stwCorporate Governanceen
dc.subject.stwManagervergütungen
dc.subject.stwSchätzungen
dc.subject.stwUSAen
dc.titleWhy do firms engage in selective hedging?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn686615093en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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