Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56368 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 740
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We study firms' incentives to acquire costly information in booms and recessions to understand the role of endogenous information in explaining asymmetric business cycles. When the economy has been in a boom in the previous period, and firms enter the current period with an optimistic belief, the incentive to acquire information is weaker than when the economy has been in a recession and firms share a pessimistic belief. However, the price system, in transmitting information from informed to uninformed firms, moderates asymmetric incentives in information acquisition and renders the aggregate learning outcome approximately acyclical. Our results challenge the prevailing view of procyclical learning as the source of asymmetric business cycles.
Schlagwörter: 
information choice
rational expectations
asymmetric information
Bayesian learning
strategic substitutability
business cycle asymmetries
JEL: 
D51
D82
D83
D84
E39
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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