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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2000
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 407
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
A separating equilibrium in which competent (incompetent) leaders choose competent (incompetent) co-workers is investigated. An outside observer rewards the leader at good policy outcomes. The incompetent co-worker can, at bad outcomes, be used as scapegoat. By assumption, the leader may fail in blaming the scapegoat. Two different assumptions on the outside observer's information set are compared. If she cannot observe a failed attempt, the separating equilibrium exists only if two non-mimicking constraints are met. If she can observe a failed attempt, an additional constraint is added due to the possibility of partial mimicking.
Schlagwörter: 
Separating equilibrium
competence
transparency
co-worker
blame
JEL: 
C72
D72
D82
J33
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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