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dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Marken
dc.contributor.authorKets, Willemienen
dc.contributor.authorNorde, Henken
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:07:54Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:07:54Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56259-
dc.description.abstractNorde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; they are axiomatized in this article.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x589en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordMinimal curb setsen
dc.subject.keywordConsistencyen
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwAxiomatisierungen
dc.titleAn axiomatization of minimal curb sets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn481104410en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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