Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56220 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorVoorneveld, Marken
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:06:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:06:32Z-
dc.date.issued2002-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56220-
dc.description.abstractA product set of pure strategies is a prep set (prep is short for preparation) if it contains at least one best reply to any consistent belief that a player may have about the strategic behavior of his opponents. Minimal prep sets are shown to exists in a class of strategic games satisfying minor topological conditions. The concept of minimal prep sets is compared with (pure and mixed) Nash equilibria, minimal curb sets, and rationalizability. Additional dynamic motivation for the concept is provided by a model of adaptive play that is shown to settle down in minimal prep sets.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x485en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD83en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordnoncooperative gamesen
dc.subject.keywordinertiaen
dc.subject.keywordstatus quo biasen
dc.subject.keywordadaptive playen
dc.subject.keywordprocedural rationalityen
dc.subject.stwSpieltheorieen
dc.subject.stwAdaptive Erwartungen
dc.titlePreparation and toolkit learning-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn341474827en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
262.36 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.