Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/56175 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance No. 634
Verlag: 
Stockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI), Stockholm
Zusammenfassung: 
We model organizational decision making as costless pre-play communication. Decision making is called authoritarian if only one player is allowed to speak and consensual if all players are allowed to speak. Players are assumed to have limited cognitive capacity and we characterize their behavior under each decision making regime for two different cognitive hierarchy models. Our results suggest that authoritarian decision making is optimal when players have conflicting preferences over the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes, whereas consensual decision making is optimal when players have congruent preferences over this set. The intuition is that authoritarian decision making avoids conflict, but sometimes creates insufficient mutual trust to implement socially optimal outcomes.
Schlagwörter: 
Organizational decision making
coordination games
communication
cognitive hierarchy models
JEL: 
C72
L20
M21
M54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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