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dc.contributor.authorAlger, Ingelaen
dc.contributor.authorWeibull, Jörgen W.en
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:05:18Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:05:18Z-
dc.date.issued2007-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56172-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze the effects of family ties on the incentives for productive effort. A family is modelled as a pair of altruistic siblings. Each sibling exerts effort to produce output under uncertainty and siblings may transfer output to each other. We show that altruism has a non-monotonic effect on effort. We study how this effect depends on climate, the magnitude and volatility of returns to effort. We also analyze the evolutionary robustness of family ties and how this robustness depends on climate. We find that family ties will be stronger in milder climates than in harsher climates.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x682en
dc.subject.jelD02en
dc.subject.jelD13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen
dc.subject.keywordfamily tiesen
dc.subject.keywordmoral hazarden
dc.subject.keywordevolutionary robustnessen
dc.subject.stwFamilienökonomiken
dc.subject.stwSoziales Verhaltenen
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwMoral Hazarden
dc.subject.stwLeistungsanreizen
dc.subject.stwLeistungsmotivationen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe fetters of the sib: Weber meets Darwin-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn551493496en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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