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dc.contributor.authorBuccirossi, Paoloen
dc.contributor.authorSpagnolo, Giancarloen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:04:36Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:04:36Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56146-
dc.description.abstractWe study the consequences of 'leniency' - reduced legal sanctions for wrongdoers who spontaneously self-report to law enforcers - on corruption, drug dealing, and other forms of sequential, bilateral, illegal trade. We find that when not properly designed, leniency may be highly counterproductive. In reality leniency is typically moderate, in the sense of only reducing, or at best cancelling the sanctions for the self-reporting party. Moderate leniency may greatly facilitate the enforcement of long-term illegal trade relations, and may even provide an effective enforcement mechanism for occasional (one-shot) illegal transactions, which would not be enforceable otherwise.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x456en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.jelK21en
dc.subject.jelK42en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordLaw enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordSelf-reportingen
dc.subject.keywordCorruptionen
dc.subject.keywordCrimeen
dc.subject.keywordIllegal tradeen
dc.subject.keywordDrug dealingen
dc.subject.stwKorruptionen
dc.subject.stwStrafverfahrenen
dc.subject.stwWirtschaftskriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe effects of leniency on illegal transactions: How (not) to fight corruption-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333197151en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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