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dc.contributor.authorSegendorff, Björnen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-29-
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:03:39Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:03:39Z-
dc.date.issued2000-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56111-
dc.description.abstractThis study investigates under what circumstances there exist a separating equilibrium in which competent leaders choose incompetent co-workers and incompetent leaders choose competent co-workers. The driving force for the competent leader is the insurance motive; if things go wrong he can blame the incompetent co-worker and remain his reputation of being competent. For the incompetent leader the expected gain from such an insurance is outweighed by its costs in terms of lower expected policy outcome. Co-workers are motivated by career opportunities allowing for conflicting interests between the leader and the co-worker.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x406en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD72en
dc.subject.jelD82en
dc.subject.jelJ33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordSeparating equilibriumen
dc.subject.keywordcompetenceen
dc.subject.keywordco-workeren
dc.subject.keywordblameen
dc.subject.keywordscapegoaten
dc.titleA signalling theory of scapegoats-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn687679699en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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