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dc.contributor.authorLe Coq, Chloéen
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-28T13:02:22Z-
dc.date.available2012-03-28T13:02:22Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/56077-
dc.description.abstractIt has been argued that having a contract market before the spot market enhances competition (Allaz and Vila, 1993). Taking into account the repeated nature of electricity markets, we check the robustness of the argument that the access to contract markets reduces the market power of generators. In particular, we investigate the sensitivity of this result with respect to the finite horizon assumption. This paper proposes a model of the electricity market where firms sign long-term supply contracts with their retailers. Subsequently, the firms repeatedly interact on the spot market. It is shown that contract markets help sustain collusion on the spot market.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aStockholm School of Economics, The Economic Research Institute (EFI) |cStockholmen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aSSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance |x552en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD43en
dc.subject.jelG13en
dc.subject.jelL13en
dc.subject.jelL94en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordContract marketen
dc.subject.keywordElectricityen
dc.subject.keywordSpot Marketen
dc.subject.keywordForwarden
dc.subject.keywordTacit collusionen
dc.subject.stwElektrizitätswirtschaften
dc.subject.stwMarkten
dc.subject.stwTermingeschäften
dc.subject.stwKartellen
dc.subject.stwVertragsrechten
dc.titleLong-term supply contracts and collusion in the electricity market-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn379433389en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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