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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2012
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 12-014
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper jointly analyses the consequences of adverse selection and signalling on entry wages of skilled employees. It uses German linked employer employee panel data (LIAB) and introduces a measure for relative productivity of skilled job applicants based on apprenticeship wages. It shows that post-apprenticeship employer changers are a negative selection from the training firms' point of view. Negative selection leads to lower average wages of employer changersin the first skilled job in comparison to stayers. Entry wages of employer changers are specifically reduced by high occupation and training firm retention rates. Additional training firm signals are high apprenticeship wages that signal a positive selection of apprenticeship applicants, works councils and establishment size. Finally, positive individual signals such as schooling background affect the skilled entry wages of employer changers positively.
Schlagwörter: 
entry wages
employer change
adverse selection
signalling
JEL: 
J24
J31
J62
J63
M52
M53
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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