Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55552 
Kompletter Metadatensatz
DublinCore-FeldWertSprache
dc.contributor.authorJamison, Julian C.en
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-19-
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-23T07:59:32Z-
dc.date.available2012-02-23T07:59:32Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/55552-
dc.description.abstractIn economic situations a player often has preferences regarding not only his or her own outcome but also regarding what happens to fellow players, concerns that are entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down a player's final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper, building on a model due to Bergstrom (1989, 1999), presents a simple structure in the context of game theory that incorporates the synergies between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet it is straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFederal Reserve Bank of Boston |cBoston, MAen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Papers |x11-15en
dc.subject.jelC72en
dc.subject.jelD03en
dc.subject.jelD64en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordaltruismen
dc.subject.keywordinterdependent preferencesen
dc.subject.keywordfairnessen
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen
dc.titleGames with synergistic preferences-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn680150544en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
188.9 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.