Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/55014
Authors: 
Graf Lambsdorff, Johann
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere: Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe V-60-10
Abstract: 
This study embeds transaction cost analysis into a Law and Economics model to produce general recommendations on how to deter bribery. Governments may deter bribery either by high penalties and risks of detection, potentially supported by leniency given to those who report their infraction (deterrence regime). Another local optimum is achieved if the government amplifies the risk of opportunism, aggravating the difficulties of enforcing a bribe transaction. This involves a low probability of detection and allowing offenders to keep their ill-gotten gains. If bribes are paid upfront bribe taking will face only mild punishment (constrained enforcement regime).
Subjects: 
Bribery
Corruption
Leniency
Enforcement
Deterrence
Opportunism
Reporting
Whistle-blowing
Nullity
JEL: 
K42
D73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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