Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/55006 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Passauer Diskussionspapiere - Volkswirtschaftliche Reihe No. V-57-08
Verlag: 
Universität Passau, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Passau
Zusammenfassung: 
Governments and private firms try to contain corruption among their staff mostly in a top-down, rules-based approach. They limit discretion, increase monitoring or impose harsher penalties. Principles-based, bottom-up approaches to anticorruption, instead, emphasize the importance of value systems and employee's intrinsic motivation. This embraces the invigorating of social control systems, encouraging whistle-blowing, coding of good practice and alerting to red flags. This paper investigates how some top-down measures run counter to bottom-up contributions. Examples range from penalties imposed with zero-tolerance, debarment or the nullity of contracts. While top-down elements are indispensable for containing corruption they must be designed well in order to avoid discouraging the bottom-up endeavors.
Schlagwörter: 
Corruption
whistle-blowing
contract penalties
debarment
nullity
JEL: 
D73
K42
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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