Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/54492 
Year of Publication: 
2009
Citation: 
[Journal:] Investigaciones Europeas de Dirección y Economía de la Empresa (IEDEE) [ISSN:] 1135-2523 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] Elsevier [Place:] Amsterdam [Year:] 2009 [Pages:] 83-99
Publisher: 
Elsevier, Amsterdam
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to analyze if the choice of different mechanisms of governance affects the efficiency of hotel chain from the Transaction Cost Economics perspective. The analysis has been carried out using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) on the Spanish leader hotel company, Sol Meliá. Results suggest that all the establishment of this hotel chain obtain high levels of efficiency but we cannot conclude that a particular type of mechanism of governance is more efficient than others. We conclude then that the choice of the mechanism of governance does not affect the level of efficiency in this particular case. It seems that other technical variables are more relevant than the type of contract used to manage the establishments.
Subjects: 
efficiency
DEA
hotel system
Sol Meliá
contractuals forms
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
220.6 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.