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dc.contributor.authorKryvtsov, Oleksiyen
dc.contributor.authorShukayev, Maliken
dc.contributor.authorUeberfeldt, Alexanderen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T12:58:58Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T12:58:58Z-
dc.date.issued2008-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.34989/swp-2008-37en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53972-
dc.description.abstractThis paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit this issue by introducing imperfect credibility, which is modeled as gradual adjustment of the private sector's beliefs about the policy change. We find that gains from switching to pricelevel targeting are small. A welfare loss occurs, if imperfect credibility is highly persistent.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aBank of Canada |cOttawaen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aBank of Canada Working Paper |x2008-37en
dc.subject.jelE31en
dc.subject.jelE52en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordCredibilityen
dc.subject.keywordMonetary policy frameworken
dc.subject.stwGeldpolitisches Zielen
dc.subject.stwZentralbanken
dc.subject.stwInflation Targetingen
dc.subject.stwPreisniveauen
dc.subject.stwGlaubwürdigkeiten
dc.subject.stwWohlfahrtseffekten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleAdopting price-level targeting under imperfect credibility: An update-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn584976593en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:bca:bocawp:08-37en

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