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dc.contributor.authorKamijo, Yoshioen
dc.contributor.authorKawasaki, Ryoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-15T11:34:31Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-15T11:34:31Z-
dc.date.issued2009-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53400-
dc.description.abstractWhile most of the literature starting with Shapley and Scarf (1974) have considered a static exchange economy with indivisibilities, this paper studies the dynamics of such an economy. We find that both the dynamics generated by competitive equilibrium and the one generated by weakly dominance relation, converge to a set of allocations we define as strictly stable, which we can show to exist. Moreover, we show that even when only pairwise exchanges between two traders are allowed, the strictly stable allocations are attained eventually if traders are sufficiently farsighted.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aFondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |cMilanoen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aNota di Lavoro |x51.2009en
dc.subject.jelD78en
dc.subject.jelC71en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIndivisible Goods Marketen
dc.subject.keywordDynamicsen
dc.subject.keywordCompetitive Allocationen
dc.subject.keywordStrict Coreen
dc.subject.keywordForesighten
dc.subject.keywordStable Seten
dc.titleDynamics, stability, and foresight in the Shapley-Scarf housing market-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn645176265en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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