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dc.contributor.authorMehlum, Halvoren
dc.contributor.authorMoene, Karl Oveen
dc.contributor.authorTorvik, Ragnaren
dc.date.accessioned2011-12-14T09:47:35Z-
dc.date.available2011-12-14T09:47:35Z-
dc.date.issued2001-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/53079-
dc.description.abstractWe consider extortion gangs that are mafia-like in their protection of targets, but that are unlike the Mafia in their competition over targets. Does this type of organized crime pay? How are the returns to extortion affected by the number of competing extortionists and the violence they apply? Does the supply of extortions create the demand for protection that the groups live from? In order to answer such questions we analyse a model that focus on the trade-off between congestion and demand creation in the market for extortions. – violence ; extortion ; economics of organized crimeen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) |cHelsinkien
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWIDER Discussion Paper |x2001/26en
dc.subject.jelD74en
dc.subject.jelK00en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.stwOrganisierte Kriminalitäten
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleThe market for extortions-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn333387694en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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