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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2001
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
WIDER Discussion Paper No. 2001/51
Verlag: 
The United Nations University World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER), Helsinki
Zusammenfassung: 
War provides economic opportunities, such as the capture of valuable natural resources, that are unavailable in peacetime. However, belligerents may prefer low-intensity conflict to total war when the former has a greater pay-off. The paper therefore uses a two-actor model to capture the continuum from total war to complete peace that often characterises Africa's conflicts. This is in contrast to the existing literature with its focus on mutually exclusive states of total war or complete peace, an assumption which is more relevant to Europe's inter-state wars than to Africa's civil wars. The paper also discusses changes in the economic incentives of belligerents that may induce peaceful behaviour. – aid ; conflict ; natural resources ; sub-Saharan Africa
JEL: 
O10
O55
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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