Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51878 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5501
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Conventional wisdom suggests that an increase in monetary incentives should induce agents to exert higher effort. In this paper, however, we demonstrate that this may not hold in team settings. In the context of sequential team production with positive externalities between agents, incentive reversal might occur: an increase in monetary incentives (either because rewards increase or effort costs decrease) may lead agents to exert lower effort in the completion of a joint task - even if agents are fully rational, self-centered money maximizers. Herein we discuss this seemingly paradoxical phenomenon and report on two experiments that provide supportive evidence.
Schlagwörter: 
incentives
incentive reversal
team production
externalities
laboratory experiments
personnel economics
JEL: 
C92
D23
J31
J33
J41
M12
M52
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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