Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/51794 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5859
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second coordination friction affects network clearing. We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. The wage mechanism determines both the distribution of networks that can arise and the number of matches on a given network. Equilibria that exhibit wage dispersion are inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a realized network.
Schlagwörter: 
efficiency
network clearing
random bipartite network formation
simultaneous search
JEL: 
D83
D85
E24
J64
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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