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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5660
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper examines the interaction between minimum wage legislation and tax evasion by employed labor. I develop a model in which firms and workers may agree to report less than the true amount of earnings to the fiscal authorities. I show that introducing a minimum wage creates a spike in the distribution of declared earnings and induces higher compliance by some agents, thus reducing their disposable income. The comparison of food consumption and of the consumption-income gap before and after the massive minimum wage hike that took place in Hungary in 2001 reveals that households who appeared to benefit from the hike actually experienced a drop compared to similar but unaffected households, thus supporting the prediction of the theory.
Schlagwörter: 
minimum wage
tax evasion
spike
Hungary
JEL: 
J38
H24
H26
H32
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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