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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2010
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 5325
Verlag: 
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
Incentives often fail in inducing economic agents to engage in a desirable activity; implementability is restricted. What restricts implementability? When does re-organization help to overcome this restriction? This paper shows that any restriction of implementability is caused by an identification problem. It also describes organizations that can solve this identification problem and provides conditions under which such organisations exist. Applying the findings to established and new moral hazard models yields insights into optimal organization design, uncovers the reason why certain organization designs, such as advocacy or specialization, overcome restricted implementability, and formalizes a widespread type of multi-tasking problem.
Schlagwörter: 
moral hazard
hidden action
implementation
multi-tasking
identification by organization design
JEL: 
D86
M52
J33
D82
M41
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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