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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2011
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
ZEW Discussion Papers No. 11-065
Verlag: 
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung (ZEW), Mannheim
Zusammenfassung: 
We explored experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects coordination success in a threshold public goods game. Whereas all groups succeeded in providing the public good when the exact value of the threshold was known, uncertainty was generally detrimental for the public good provision. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty was particularly severe when it took the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players were not only unaware of the value of the threshold but also of its probability distribution. Early signaling of willingness to contribute and share the burden equitably helped groups in coping with threshold uncertainty.
Schlagwörter: 
Public good
threshold uncertainty
ambiguity
experiment
JEL: 
C72
C92
H41
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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