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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2005
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KOF Working Papers No. 113
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
The paper develops a theoretical model showing a mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. According to the model, higher corruption induces stricter restrictions and vice versa. We test the model using panel data for 112 countries over the period 1984-2002 and find that corruption and restrictions are indeed mutually determined. Estimating the model simultaneously, capital account restrictions induce higher corruption. Higher corruption, in turn, is associated with more restrictions on the capital account. The empirical relationship is, however, not completely robust.
Schlagwörter: 
corruption
capital account restrictions
dynamic panel
JEL: 
C33
D19
F33
G11
H26
O17
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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