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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2006
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
KOF Working Papers No. 143
Verlag: 
ETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, Zurich
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper uses a new data set on the term in office of central bank governors in 137 countries covering the period 1970-2004 to estimate a model for the chance that a central bank governor is replaced. We formulate a number of hypotheses based on the literature on the determinants of central bank independence that are tested using conditional logit models and the Extreme Bounds Analysis. We conclude that, apart from the share of the current term in office elapsed, high levels of political and regime instability, the occurrence of elections, and high inflation increase the probability of a turnover.
Schlagwörter: 
central bank governors
central bank independence
JEL: 
E5
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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