Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/50622
Authors: 
Evenhuis, Emil
Vickerman, Roger
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
School of Economics discussion papers 10,04
Abstract: 
Public-Private Partnerships have become a favoured way of introducing private capital into transport projects whilst maintaining an element of public interest. This paper considers the potential conflicts that might arise between the freedom of the private operator within a PPP and other elements of the public sector's transport policy. Specifically it tackles the question of the problems that might arise when the public sector wishes to implement a type of price regulation, for example SMC Pricing, which might appear to limit the freedom of the private interest to maximise its value from the PPP according to the contract. The paper demonstrates theoretically the potential inconsistencies between such policies and suggest ways in which they may be overcome.
Subjects: 
public-private partnerships
social marginal cost pricing
incentives
contracts
EU transport policy
JEL: 
L14
L33
L51
L91
R48
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
283.54 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.