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dc.contributor.authorSchosser, Stephanen
dc.contributor.authorVogt, Bodoen
dc.date.accessioned2011-08-25-
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-07T14:14:53Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-07T14:14:53Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.5445/IR/1000024153en
dc.identifier.piurn:nbn:de:swb:90-241537en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50508-
dc.description.abstractWe analyze cooperative behavior of participants who faced a loss. In particular, we extend the Public Good Game by a fixed loss in the beginning of every period. We show that humans change their behavior compared to corresponding studies with gains only. First, in contrast to literature on gains, we observe significant order effects. When participants first play a treatment with punishment, they cooperate less and face higher punishment costs than when first playing a treatment without punishment. The changes are that drastic that punishment does not pay in the first case, while it does in the later. Second, for participants first playing without punishment the contributions in the very first period of play determine the contributions throughout both treatments of the game, yielding higher contributions in the punishment treatment than when playing with gains. Participants punishing first, show no comparable behavior.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKarlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre (ECON) |cKarlsruheen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKIT Working Paper Series in Economics |x33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordpublic gooden
dc.subject.keywordpunishmenten
dc.subject.keywordlossesen
dc.subject.keywordexperimenten
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwNichtkooperatives Spielen
dc.subject.stwStrafeen
dc.subject.stwTesten
dc.titleThe public loss game: An experimental study of public bads-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn667027807en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:kitwps:33en

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