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dc.contributor.authorMoser, Christophen
dc.contributor.authorSturm, Jan-Egberten
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-05-
dc.date.accessioned2011-10-06T15:41:33Z-
dc.date.available2011-10-06T15:41:33Z-
dc.date.issued2011-
dc.identifier.pidoi:10.3929/ethz-a-006435829en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/50432-
dc.description.abstractThis paper empirically investigates the economic and political factors that affect a country's likelihood to sign an arrangement with the IMF and the determinants of the financial size of such a program. Arguably the world and the global financial architecture underwent structural changes after the ending of Cold War and so did the role of the IMF. Hence, we update and extend the work of Sturm et al. (2005) by employing a panel model for 165 countries that focuses on the post-Cold War era, i.e., 1990-2009. Our results, based on extreme bounds analysis, suggest that some economic and political variables are robustly related to these two dimensions of IMF program decisions. Furthermore, we show that it is important to distinguish between concessional and non-concessional IMF loans.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aETH Zurich, KOF Swiss Economic Institute |cZurichen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aKOF Working Papers |x279en
dc.subject.jelO19en
dc.subject.jelF33en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordIMFen
dc.subject.keywordlending facilitiesen
dc.subject.keywordextreme bounds analysisen
dc.titleExplaining IMF lending decisions after the Cold War-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn667701915en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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