Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/49681
Authors: 
Gächter, Simon
Renner, Elke
Year of Publication: 
2010
Series/Report no.: 
CeDEx discussion paper series 2010-12
Abstract: 
Belief elicitation is an important methodological issue for experimental economists. There are two generic questions: 1) Do incentives increase belief accuracy? 2) Are there interaction effects of beliefs and decisions? We investigate these questions in the case of finitely repeated public goods experiments. We find that belief accuracy is significantly higher when beliefs are incentivized. The relationship between contributions and beliefs is slightly steeper under incentives. However, we find that incentivized beliefs tend to lead to higher contribution levels than either non-incentivized beliefs or no beliefs at all. We discuss the implications of our results for the design of public good experiments.
Subjects: 
incentives
beliefs
experimental methodology
public goods
JEL: 
C90
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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