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dc.contributor.authorSousa, Sergioen
dc.date.accessioned2010-08-03-
dc.date.accessioned2011-09-26T13:24:10Z-
dc.date.available2011-09-26T13:24:10Z-
dc.date.issued2010-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/49677-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the efficacy of a punishment mechanism in promoting cooperative behaviour in a public goods game when enforcement of punishment is uncertain. Experimental studies have found that a sanctioning system can induce individuals to adopt behaviour deemed as socially acceptable. Yet, our experiment shows that a sanctioning system cannot promote cooperative behaviour if enforcement is a low-probability event and free-riding behaviour is not often punished. This supports the view that punishment needs to be exercised to be feared, otherwise the simple threat of it cannot be effective in promoting cooperation.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aThe University of Nottingham, Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics (CeDEx) |cNottinghamen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aCeDEx Discussion Paper Series |x2010-06en
dc.subject.jelC92en
dc.subject.jelD81en
dc.subject.jelH41en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keyworduncertain enforcementen
dc.subject.keywordpublic good gameen
dc.subject.keywordaltruistic punishmenten
dc.subject.keyworddecisionmaking under uncertaintyen
dc.subject.keywordcooperationen
dc.subject.stwÖffentliches Guten
dc.subject.stwVerhaltensökonomiken
dc.subject.stwKooperationen
dc.subject.stwAltruismusen
dc.subject.stwStrafeen
dc.titleCooperation and punishment under uncertain enforcement-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn632210672en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen

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